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Abstract 
This study examines the Nigerian banking consolidation process using a dynamic panel for the 
period 2000-2010. The Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic GMM approach is adopted to 
estimate a cost function taking into account the possible endogeneity of the covariates. The 
main finding is that the Nigerian banking sector has benefited from the consolidation process, 
and specifically that foreign ownership, mergers and acquisitions and bank size decrease costs.  
Directions for future research are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the impact of banking consolidation in Nigeria on banks’ costs during 
the period 2000-2010.  This process started in 2004 after the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
announced new capital requirements for Nigerian banks. The intention was to make banks 
increase their average size through mergers and acquisitions. Some of them could neither 
satisfy the new capital requirements nor find a suitable merger partner, and therefore were 
forced to go into liquidation. As a result, their number was considerably reduced. Not 
surprisingly, all foreign banks survived the recapitalisation as they usually relied on capital 
injections from the parent company to meet the capital requirements. The total number of 
Nigerian banks immediately after the consolidation, that is, before the Stanbic Bank/IBTC 
merger, was 25 (Hesse, 2007; Porter, 2007; Assaf, Barros and Ibiowie, 2011).  
The present study makes a threefold contribution. First, it provides evidence on the impact of 
consolidation on costs in the specific case of Nigerian banks, as this can vary from country to 
country, depending on market characteristics and regulations (Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo, 
2002; Vander Vennet, 2002). Second, it adds to the limited number of existing studies on 
banking consolidation (Chapelle and Plane, 2005a; 2005b; Francis, Hasan and Wang, 2008; 
Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Binam, Gockowski, and Nkamleu, 2008; Igbekele, 2008; 
Assaf, Barros and Ibiowie, 2011) by estimating a more suitable dynamic model rather than 
conducting the efficiency analysis typical of most papers. In particular, it adopts the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) dynamic GMM method. Third, it focuses on Africa, a region which has 
attracted only limited attention in the literature (Figueira, Nellis, and Parker, 2006; Hauner and 
Peiris, 2005; Okeahalam, 2006), most studies examining instead European or US banks. 
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the main features and the 
evolution of the Nigerian banking sector. Section 3 provides a brief review of the literature on 
banking efficiency. Section 4 outlines the econometric approach. Section 5 specifies the 
hypotheses to be tested. Section 6 discusses data sources and definitions. Section 7 presents the 
empirical results. Section 8 summarises the main findings and their implications and suggests 
directions for future research. 
 
2. The Nigerian Banking Environment 
 
The Nigerian banking system has evolved since the colonial periods in three distinct phases. 
The first, generally referred to as the free-banking era, was the pre-independence period when 
the industry was dichotomised between foreign and indigenous banks. The foreign banks, 
which obtained their operating licences abroad and dominated banking activities during this 
era, were seen to act solely in the interest of their foreign owners rather than of Nigerians and 
of the Nigerian economy (Brownbridge, 1996). Since there was neither a banking legislation 
nor a regulator, entry was relatively free. This created an avenue for all kinds of speculative 
investors who operated banks that were generally under-capitalised and poorly managed. Early 
exit was common among the domestic banks, which were clearly disadvantaged. By 1940, the 
majority of indigenous banks had collapsed, with the only survivors being those that were 
established and, in all likelihood, patronised by the three regional governments. Yet this did not 
stop the creation of more banks: there were in fact 150 indigenous banks established between 
1940 and 1952 (Adegbite, 2007). The experience of the banking crashes of the 1930s and 
1940s possibly informed the government’s decision to adopt in 1952 the banking ordinance, 
which represents the first major attempt at regulating banking operations. However, this 
regulation appeared to make little or no impact on the way banking was conducted, as there 
was no regulator to enforce compliance. The CBN was established in 1959 to regulate and 
perform other overseeing functions (Hesse, 2007). The second phase was the indigenisation 
period of the 1970s when the government introduced various control measures such as the 
nationalisation of foreign-owned banks, entry restrictions, a deposit rate floor or an interest rate 
ceiling. This period is known as the static period which reflects the low number of banks and 
the establishment of very few branches by the existing banks. 
The next phase began in 1986 with the implementation of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) prescribed by the World Bank/IMF. Some of the control measures such as 
entry conditions, sectoral credit allocation quotas and interest rate regulation of the 
indigenisation period were relaxed. This reintroduced dilution into the industry and the number 
of banks increased from 42 in 1986 to 107 in 1990, and by 1992 it had reached 120. The sharp 
increase in the number of banks without a correspondingly large increase in the capacity of the 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms caused both off-site surveillance and on-site 
examination of banks to suffer (Oyejide, 1993). Systemic failure resulted. Rather than 
mobilising and allocating resources to needy sectors, disintermediation was witnessed as many 
of the new banks, commonly referred to as new generation banks, preferred to make money 
through arbitrage and other rent-seeking activities (Lewis and Stein, 1997). Hesse (2007) 
suggests as a possible explanation the fact that the parallel exchange rate that prevailed in that 
period allowed banks quickly to make profits from various arbitrage opportunities rather than 
intermediate between depositors and lenders. Also, many of the banks owned by local investors 
seemed to have been set up primarily in order for their owners to obtain foreign exchange 
which could be sold at a premium (Brownbridge, 1996). The banks that were owned by state 
governments, 25 as of 1989, accumulated bad debts because of the extension of proprietary 
loans to the state governments and to politically influential borrowers (Brownbridge, 1996). 
This probably explains why some analysts believe that the distress in the banking sector 
originated from SAP as bureaucrats allocated resources through discretionary policies. Because 
of the high fragmentation and low financial intermediation of the banks, the government in 
1991 established some prudential guidelines (Hesse, 2007) through the promulgation of the 
Banking and Other Financial Institutions Decree (BOFID) and placed an embargo on issuing 
new bank licences. Shortly after, 24 of the existing banks were found to be insolvent and were 
liquidated. Thus, by 2004, the number of banks had been reduced to 89. Despite government 
intervention, the remaining 89 banks were characterised by a low capital base, insolvency and 
illiquidity, overdependence on public sector deposits and foreign exchange trading, poor asset 
quality and weak corporate governance (Soludo, 2006). This led to another round of 
recapitalisation in 2004 when banks were required to increase their minimum capital base from 
Naira 2 billion to Naira 25 billion by the end of 2005. This brought about radical changes to the 
structure and nature of banking operations.  
Other important results of the consolidation process were that bank branch networks rose from 
3382 prior to consolidation to 4500 post consolidation, aggregate bank assets increased from 
Naira 3209 billion in 2004 to Naira 6555 billion in 2006 and the capital adequacy ratio climbed 
from 15.2% in 2004 to 21.6% in 2006 (Balogun, 2007). More information on the performance 
of the banking industry is provided in Table 1.  
 
<<Insert Table 1 around here>>> 
 
 
3. Literature Review 
Most studies on banks’ efficiency (Altunbas¸, Gardener, Molyneux, and Moore, 2001; Berger, 
1995; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997; Bos and Schmiedel, 2007; 
Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson, 2001; Maudos, Pastor, Pérez, and Quesada, 2002; Schure, 
Wagenvoort, and O’Brien, 2004; Williams, Peypoch and Barros, 2009) focus on the US and 
Europe and neglect banks in emerging countries such as Nigeria. Multi-country analysis 
usually considers factors such as legal tradition, accounting conventions, regulatory structures, 
property rights, culture and religion as possible explanations for cross-border variations in 
financial development and economic growth (Beck, Demirgüc¸-K, and Levine, 2003; Beck and 
Levine, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Levine, 2003; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003). Studies at country level usually focus on market dynamics as determinants 
of efficiency (Arpa, Giulini, Ittner, and Pauer, 2001; Bikker and Haaf, 2002), or provisions for 
loan losses which can exert a negative impact on the level of economic activity (Cavallo and 
Majnoni, 2002; Cavallo and Rossi, 2001; Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). Other factors such as 
market structure and bank-specific variables have been proposed on the basis of the structure–
conduct–performance paradigm, and have been used to test the role of ownership and 
governance in explaining bank performance (see Berger, 1995; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; 
Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Goddard et al., 2001; Molyneux, Altunbas¸, and Gardener, 1996). In 
general, the extensive empirical evidence does not provide conclusive proof that bank 
performance is explained by either concentrated market structures and collusive price-setting 
behaviour or superior management and production techniques. Bank performance levels are 
found to vary widely across banks and banking sectors (Altunbas¸ et al., 2001; Maudos et al., 
2002; Schure et al., 2004). 
Another strand of the literature analyses the impact of consolidation on banking costs. The need 
to reduce costs through economies of scales and scope, or to increase revenues through gaining 
additional market shares, are usually the main drivers of consolidation (Amel, Barnes, Panetta, 
and Salleo, 2004). The literature also discusses the linkage between mergers and acquisition 
activities and the transfer of knowledge between the acquiring and the acquired company. 
However, the relationship between consolidation and costs does not seem to be always positive. 
Some studies, for instance, suggest that efficiency gains from consolidation disappear after a 
certain size is reached and that above a certain threshold a firm might start exhibiting 
diseconomies of scale (Amel et al., 2004). The increase in size also creates further pressure on 
managers owing to the difficulty of managing large institutions. The evidence for the banking 
industry is mixed. Banal-Estañol and Ottaviani (2006, 2007), for instance, highlighted the need 
for diversification to ensure the success of bank mergers. They also argued that mergers are not 
always beneficial as they might make firms more aggressive when they compete in quantities. 
The evidence on the effects of consolidation also seems to vary by country. This is because 
each country has its own market characteristics and regulations (Focarelli, Panetta, and Salleo, 
2002; Vander Vennet, 2002). In general, no strong evidence on the benefit of consolidation is 
found in the US, while in Europe the conclusions seem to be mixed (Carbo and Humphrey, 
2004; Cavallo and Rossi, 2001; Diaz, Garcia, and Sanfilippo, 2004; Esho, 2001; Sathye, 2001). 
For Asian countries such as Japan the conclusions are also mixed and vary with the period 
analysed (Drake and Hall, 2003).  
 
 
 
4. Methodology 
As mentioned above, the present paper aims to analyse the impact of consolidation on banking 
costs in Nigeria. The empirical specification is a cost function estimated as a dynamic log-
linear model which includes a lagged dependent variable aiming to capture persistent effects 
and takes into account the possible endogeneity of the covariates. In particular, the Arellano-
Bond (1991) approach is taken. This is commonly used in applied research ( Baltagi et al, 2009; 
Bauxauli-Soler and Sanchez Marin, 2011) and has the following form: 
                   (1) 
(2) 
where Cit is the dependent variable measuring bank cost performance, Ci,t-1 is the lagged 
dependent variable, xit is a vector of observable corporate governance covariates for firm 
i=1,…,N and years t=1,…,N.  and the vector  are the parameters to be estimated. The error 
term vit in equation (1) includes the unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics ci (fixed 
effects) and uit, which is the idiosyncratic error (equation 2). This model formulation is 
appropriate in our case, because it allows for dynamics in the dependent variable, a plausible 
assumption, since the best-performing banks are likely to remain so over the following year.  
Several econometric issues arise when estimating this model. First, the covariates can 
be endogenous because causality may run in both directions and, therefore, these regressors 
may be correlated with the error term. Second, fixed effects ci can be correlated with the 
covariates. Thirdly, the presence of the lagged dependent variable gives rise to autocorrelation. 
Finally, the panel dataset has a short time dimension and a medium banks’ dimension. The 
Arellano and Bond (1991) linear dynamic panel data estimation is adequate in this context and 
TtNiucv itiit ,...,1 ; ,...,1   , 
 1,1 itittiit vCC   x
includes the first lag of the dependent variable (equation 1) as a covariate and unobserved fixed 
effects (as in equation 2).  By introducing autocorrelation into the model, the unobserved 
effects ci become correlated with the lagged dependent variables, thus making the standard 
estimators inconsistent. To address this issue, the Arellano and Bond (AB) procedure starts 
with the transformation of all regressors by differencing equation (1), 
 (3) 
In this way, the time-invariant parameter ci in equation (2) is removed. Arellano and 
Bond (1991), building on Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and using the general method of moments 
(GMM) framework developed by Hansen (1982), identify the lags of the dependent variable 
that are valid instruments and explain how to combine these lagged variables into a larger 
instrument matrix. They found that lag 2 or higher of the dependent variable are valid 
instruments. Furthermore, if the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenous, lagged levels 
of these variables can also be added as additional instruments. This estimator is designed for 
datasets with many units and few periods, and it requires that there be no autocorrelation in the 
idiosyncratic errors. 
 
5. Factors Affecting The Efficiency of Banks 
Our aim is to test the relationship between banks’ costs and the following covariates: foreign 
bank membership, banks involved in mergers and acquisitions, bank size and consolidation 
period. The reasons for the selection of each of these covariates and the hypotheses to be tested 
are explained below. 
 
 
5.1 Foreign Ownership 
Foreign ownership might have an impact on costs by contributing to the transfer of knowledge 
and economies of scale between banks belonging to the same group. Chiu et al. (2008), for 
example, tested this hypothesis on a sample of Taiwanese firms and reached the conclusion that 
 1,1 itittiit uCC   x
group affiliation can be beneficial, though this might be dependent on the size of the group. 
Other studies have also linked the success of group affiliation to the type of market, firms with 
group affiliation tending to outperform those without in competing markets, since for the latter 
it is harder to gain new market shares (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Ghemawat and Khanna, 
1998; Cho, 2007; Griffith-Jones, 2007). Therefore it might be more profitable to join a foreign 
group, thereby sharing its resources and reputation to make up for external market failures 
(Khanna and Paleou, 2000).   
H1: Foreign group ownership decreases Nigerian banks’ costs. This hypothesis is tested with 
the variable “Foreign”. 
 
5.2 Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions between similar companies are known as horizontal mergers 
(Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford, 2001), and aim to improve cost performance and synergy 
through a larger market share. In the former case the merged companies reduce operating costs 
but keep the premises of the merged or acquired company (Garette and Dussauge, 2000).  
H2: Bank mergers and acquisitions reduce Nigerian banks’ costs. This hypothesis is tested with 
the variable “M&A”. 
 
 
 
5.3  Firm Size 
It is often argued that large firms might be more efficient, because they can use more 
specialised inputs, coordinate their resources better, reap the advantages of economies of scale 
(Alvarez and Crespi, 2003) and make up for external market failures (Khanna and Palepu, 
2000; Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998). Related studies also indicated that firm size has a positive 
impact on efficiency and decreases costs (Altunbas et al., 1997, Berger and Humphrey, 1991, 
Alvarez and Arias, 2003).  
H3: An increase in bank size reduces Nigerian banks’ costs. This hypothesis is tested with the 
variable “Total Assets”. 
 
5.4 Banking Consolidation 
Banking consolidation aims to improve cost performance (Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo, 
2004) and therefore it may have a negative impact on banks’ costs. This hypothesis will be 
tested with a consolidation dummy variable. 
H4: Banking consolidation reduces Nigerian banks’ costs. 
 
6. Data  
The dependent variable in our model is banks’ costs, that have been extensively analysed in the 
empirical literature (Francis, Hasan and Wang, 2008; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Assaf, 
Barros and Ibiowie, 2011). The independent variables listed in Table 2 were selected on the 
basis of microeconomic theory (Varian, 2009). 
Our sample includes all the 25 Nigerian banks that got past the recapitalisation hurdle. Data 
were collected from annual reports of the banks for the period 2000-2010 (275 observations).  
In the empirical banking literature, there are two approaches to measuring banks’ outputs and 
costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The production approach treats banks as producing 
accounts of various sizes by processing deposits and loans, and incurring capital and labour 
costs. Operating costs are thus specified in the cost function and output is measured as the 
number of deposits and loan accounts. The intermediation approach sees banks as transforming 
deposits and purchased funds into loans and other assets. Costs are expressed as total operating 
plus interest costs and output is measured in monetary units. These two approaches have been 
applied in different ways. Limited data availability means that in our case we are constrained to 
apply only the intermediation approach, which is in fact the most commonly used one in  
banking studies (Sealey and Lindley, 1977; Berger and Humphrey,1997). The estimated 
function is the following: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
with the associated factor share equations. 
The data characteristics are presented in Table 2. 
<<Insert Table 2 around here>> 
 
7. Results 
The results based on the Arellano-Bond (1991) model using three different specifications are 
presented in Table 3. F-tests suggest that the third specification should be preferred. The 
Hausman test is used to test for endogeneity (omitted variable biased, measurement error, or 
reverse causality; Woldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2001). The Hausman statistic is 145.41 (p-value 
0.000) and therefore the hypothesis that the variables are endogenous is clearly rejected.  
 
<<Insert Table 3 around here>> 
 
The autoregressive parameter  is found to be positive and statistically significant in all cases, 
which supports the use of a dynamic panel data model. The Sargan test of over-identifying 
restrictions is used to assess the validity of the instruments and the results imply acceptance of 
the null hypothesis that the restrictions are valid (Roodman, 2006). Furthermore, there is strong 
evidence against the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors at 
order 1 and 2. Overall, costs increase with positive covariates and decrease with negative ones.  
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8. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the cost performance of Nigerian banks over the period 2000-2010 using 
the Arellano-Bond panel method. Furthermore, it compares their performance in terms of costs 
before and after consolidation using a binary consolidation variable. The main finding is that 
the Nigerian banking sector has benefited from the consolidation process, and specifically that 
foreign ownership, mergers and acquisitions and bank size decrease costs.  These are important 
results for banking associations, often relying on simple methods and partial ratios in their 
analysis, as well as policy-makers: policies and regulations should take into account the 
endogeneity issue, namely the simultaneity between banks’ costs and covariates.  
Future studies could also examine in depth the impact of the current financial crisis, as a result 
of which the large and sudden capital inflows that were injected by foreign investors during the 
consolidation exercise were abruptly withdrawn. Another development was the unwillingness 
of correspondent banks to confirm lines for Nigerian banks. However, with consolidation, 
fewer banks now require correspondent banks and the reverse is also true as fewer 
correspondent banks are needed. As for the capital outflows, the CBN has injected funds into 
some of the problem banks to prevent failure, and has drawn up a four-pillar strategy with the 
aim of improving the quality of the banks by implementing risk-based supervision and 
reforming the regulatory framework (Sanusi, 2010). The recent creation of the Asset 
Management Corporation is a move in that direction. Given the fact that the impact of 
consolidation on cost efficiency is likely to differ depending on country characteristics, it 
would also be of interest to conduct the analysis for other economies in the West Africa sub-
region, as well as check the robustness of the results using alternative estimation methods. 
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Table 1: Banks’ characteristics 
Group Surviving 
Bank 
Shareholders 
funds 
Component institutions
 
No. In 
group 
1 First Bank 
58.996 
First Bank of Nigeria Plc, FBN 
Merchant 
Bankers Ltd, MBC 
3 
2 First Inland 
26.389 
IMB, First Atlantic Bank, Inland 
Bank,NUB 
4 
3 FCMB 
25.342 
First City Monument Bank, 
Cooperative 
Development Bank, Nigeria-
American 
Merchant Bank, Midas 
4 
4 Union Bank 
106.97 
Union Bank of Nigeria Plc, 
Broad Bank, UTB,Union 
Merchant Bankers 
4 
5 Wema Bank 26.230 Wema Bank, National Bank 2 
6 Unity Bank 
29.425 
Intercity Bank, First Interstate, 
Tropical 
Commercial, Pacific, 
SocieteBancaire, 
Centre-Point, NNB, Bank of the 
North, New Africa Bank Ltd. 
9 
7 ETB 28.41 ETB, Devcom 2 
8 Fidelity Bank 25.596 Fidelity, FSB International, Ma 3 
9 IBTC/Chartere
d 
33.494 Regent, IBTC, Chartered 3 
10 Intercontinenta
l 
57.25 
Intercontinental, Global, Equity, 
Gateway 
4 
11 Oceanic Bank 
36.505 
Oceanic Bank, International 
Trust Bank 
2 
12 Platinum-
Habib 
28.491 Platinum, Habib 2 
13 Sterling Bank 
25.31 
NAL, Trust Bank of Africa, 
INBM, Magnum 
Trust, NBM 
4 
14 UBA Plc 47.624 UBA, Standard Trust Bank, CTB 3 
15 Spring Bank 
41.29 
Citizens, Guardian Express, 
ACB, Omega, 
Trans International, Fountain 
Trust 
6 
16 Access Bank 
28.894 
Access, Marina International, 
Capital Bank 
3 
17 Afribank 
25.085 
Afribank, Afribank Merchant 
Bankers 
2 
18 Citibank-NIB 
33.375 
Citibank, Nigeria International 
Bank 
2 
19 Diamond Bank 
34.97 
Diamond Bank, Lion Bank, 
Africa International 
3 
20 Skye Bank 
31.469 
Prudent, EIB, Bond, Reliance, 
Coop Bank 
5 
21 Zenith Bank 95.324 Zenith 1 
22 Stanbic Bank 28.386 Stanbic Bank 1 
23 Standard 
Chartered 
33.760 Standard Chartered 1 
24 Ecobank 25.763 Ecobank 1 
25 GTB 36.420 GTB 1 
Total number of merging banks 75 
Failed banks 14 
Pre Consolidation Total 89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Description of the Variables 
Variable Description Min
a 
Max
b 
Mean  Std. Dev 
Cost Operational cost at 2000 in 
Nairas 
1266.27 91207.29 17889.44 18694.06 
CL Customer loans at 2000 in 
Nairas 
1944.95 244149.1 52933.98 51442.01 
SEC Securities at 2000 in Nairas 3464 114484.7 23470.32 22166.1 
PL Price of labour measured 
dividing the wages by the 
number of employees 
0.2026 8.878 2.357 1.370 
PD Price of deposits measured 
dividing the interest paid in 
deposits by the value of deposits 
0.0048 0.5823 0.0964 0.1034 
PK Price of capital measured 
dividing amortization by 
fixed assets 
0.0002 0.355 0.055 0.0591 
Foreign Dummy variable for Foreign 
bank 
0 1 0.12  
M&A Dummy variable for Banks 
involved in M&A activities 
0 1 0.92  
Size Size is measured by total assets 
as a proxy for bank size in 
Nairas at 2000 
          
6,798.00  
 
      
851,241.00  
 
      
139,018.83 
 
      
155,553.69  
 
Consolidation Dummy variable equal to one 
for the period 2004-2010 and 
zero elsewhere 
0 1 
0.636 
 
 
a Min – Minimum; b Max – Maximum.  
 
Table 3: Dynamic Panel Data Model Results  
 Model1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 2.319 
(4.04)*** 
0.890 
(3.40)*** 
0.852 
(3.17)*** 
L.Costt-1 0.794 
(18.61)*** 
0.501 
(9.79)*** 
0.62 
(10.15)*** 
CL 0.0005 
(3.14)*** 
0.0087 
(3.22)*** 
0.0011 
(2.83)*** 
SEC -0.0004 
(-0.04) 
-0.0008 
(-3.36)*** 
-0.00011 
(-4.01) 
PL 0.101 
(1.23) 
0.112 
(2.95)*** 
0.132 
(3.43)*** 
PK -0.936 
(-1.30) 
-0.832 
(-2.01) 
-0.013 
(-0.52) 
½ CL2 0.528 
(9.40)*** 
-0.182 
(-3.31)*** 
-0.623 
(-4.44)*** 
½ SEC2 0.968 
(3.29)*** 
-0.936 
(-3.34)*** 
-0.9189 
(-2.12)** 
½ PL2 0.980 
(3.29)*** 
-0.5219 
(-2.37) 
-0.96957 
(-3.36)** 
½ PK2 0.004 
(3.37)*** 
0.0180 
(3.02)*** 
0.200 
(3.85)* 
CL*SEC 0.968 
(3.29)*** 
0.944 
(3.81)*** 
0.658 
(10.15)*** 
CL*PL 0.980 
(3.29)*** 
0.719 
(3.22)*** 
0.853 
(3.24)*** 
CL*PK 0.012 
(2.49)** 
0.038 
(2.96)*** 
0.085 
(3.17)*** 
SEC*PL 0.980 
(3.29)*** 
0.946 
(3.34)*** 
0.753 
(4.43)*** 
SEC*PK 0.853 
(3.24)*** 
0.501 
(9.79)*** 
0.713 
(3.52)*** 
PL*PK 0.011 
(2.83)*** 
0.012 
(3.36)*** 
0.020 
(3.44)*** 
Foreign -0.025 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.062 
(-4.36) 
-0.140 
(-3.12) 
M&A -0.032 
(-3.29)*** 
-0.0259 
(-3.98) 
-0.019 
(-3.31)*** 
Size  0.012 
(3.84)*** 
0.024 
(3.24)*** 
Consolidation  
 
0.815 
(3.07)*** 
Nobs 275 275 275 
F-Statistic 
(p-value) 
17.50 
(0.000) 
17.83 
(0.000) 
17.91 
(0.000) 
First order serial correlation
a 
(p-value) 
-7.68 
(0.000) 
-7.63 
(0.000) 
-7.66 
(0.000) 
Second order serial 
correlation 
a 
(p-value) 
0.27 
(0.003) 
0.11 
(0.002) 
0.12 
(0.007) 
Sargan test 
b
 
(p-vaule) 
0.80 
(0.931) 
0.611 
(0.214) 
0.435 
(0.153) 
Notes: All models were estimated in Stata 12.  
The Z score in parentheses are below the parameters; those followed by * are statistically significant at the 1% 
level; those followed by ** are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
a 
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. H0: no autocorrelation.  
b 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions. H0: over-identifying restrictions are valid.  
  
